Abstract. Thanks to a new upper bound, we study more precisely the nonlinearities of Maiorana-McFarland's resilient functions. We characterize those functions with optimum nonlinearities and we give examples of functions with high nonlinearities. But these functions have a peculiarity which makes them potentially cryptographically weak. We study a natural super-class of Maiorana-McFarland's class whose elements do not have the same drawback and we give examples of such functions achieving high nonlinearities.
Introduction
The Boolean functions used in stream ciphers are functions from F n 2 to F 2 , where n is a positive integer. In practice, n is often small (smaller than or equal to 10), but even for small values of n, searching for the best cryptographic functions by visiting all Boolean functions in n variables is computationally impossible since their number 2 2 n is too large (for instance, for n = 7, it would need billions of times the age of the universe on a work-station). Thus, we need constructions of Boolean functions satisfying all necessary cryptographic criteria. Before describing the known constructions, we recall what are these cryptographic criteria.
Any Boolean function f in n variables (i.e. any where the additions are computed in F 2 , i.e. modulo 2, and where the a I 's are in F 2 . We call algebraic degree of a Boolean function f and we denote by d
• f the degree of its algebraic normal form. The affine functions are those functions of degrees at most 1. They are the simplest functions, from cryptographic viewpoint. On the contrary, cryptographic functions must have high degrees (cf. [3, 16, 21, 27] ).
The Hamming weight w H (f ) of a Boolean function f in n variables is the size of its support {x ∈ F n 2 ; f (x) = 1}. The Hamming distance d H (f, g) between two Boolean functions f and g is the Hamming weight of their difference, i.e. of f + g (this sum is computed modulo 2). The nonlinearity of f is its minimum distance to all affine functions. We denote by N f the nonlinearity of f . Functions used in stream ciphers must have high nonlinearities to resist the known attacks on these ciphers (correlation and linear attacks) [3] . A Boolean function f is called bent if its nonlinearity equals 2 n−1 − 2 n/2−1 , which is the maximum possible value (obviously, n must be even). Then, its distance to every affine function equals 2 n−1 ± 2 n/2−1 . This property can also be stated in terms of the Walsh (i.e., discrete Fourier, or Hadamard) transform of f defined on F x·u (where x · u denotes the usual inner product
But it is more easily stated in terms of the Walsh transform of the "sign" function χ f (x) = (−1)
f (x) , equal to χ f (u) = x∈F n
f is bent if and only if χ f (u) has constant magnitude 2 n/2 (cf. [14, 20] ). Indeed, the Hamming distances between f and the affine functions u · x and u · x + 1 are equal to 2 n−1 − 1 2 χ f (u) and 2 n−1 + 1 2 χ f (u). Thus:
Bent functions have degrees upper bounded by n/2. They are characterized by the fact that their derivatives D a f (x) = f (x) + f (x + a), a = 0, are all balanced, i.e. have weight 2 n−1 . But cryptographic functions themselves must be balanced, so that the systems using them resist statistical attacks [21] . Bent functions are not balanced.
The last (but not least) criterion considered in this paper is resiliency. It plays a central role in stream ciphers: in the standard model of these ciphers (cf. [26] ), the outputs of n linear feedback shift registers are the inputs of a Boolean function, called combining function. The output of the function produces the keystream, which is then bitwisely xored with the message to produce the cipher. Some devide-and-conquer attacks exist on this method of encryption (cf. [3, 27] ). To resist these attacks, the system must use a combining function whose output distribution probability is unaltered when any m of the inputs are fixed [27] , with m as large as possible. This property, called m-th order correlation-immunity [26] , is characterized by the set of zero values in the Walsh spectrum [30] : f is m-th order correlation-immune if and only if χ f (u) = 0, i.e. f (u) = 0, for all u ∈ F n 2 such that 1 ≤ w H (u) ≤ m, where w H (u) denotes the Hamming weight of the n-bit vector u, (the number of its nonzero components). Balanced m-th order correlation-immune functions are called m-resilient functions. They are characterized by the fact that χ f (u) = 0 for all u ∈ F n 2 such that 0 ≤ w H (u) ≤ m. Siegenthaler's inequality [26] states that any m-th order correlation immune function in n variables has degree at most n − m, that any m-resilient function (0 ≤ m < n− 1) has algebraic degree smaller than or equal to n − m − 1 and that any (n − 1)-resilient function has algebraic degree 1. Sarkar and Maitra [23] have shown that the nonlinearity of any m-resilient function (m ≤ n−2) is divisible by 2 m+1 and is therefore upper bounded by 2 n−1 − 2 m+1 . If a function achieves this bound (independently obtained by Tarannikov [28] and Zheng and Zhang [31] ), then it also achieves Siegenthaler's bound (cf. [28] ) and the Fourier spectrum of the function has then three values (such functions are often called "plateaued" or "three-valued"; cf. [2] ), these values are 0 and ±2 m+2 . More precisely, it has been shown by Carlet and Sarkar [7, 8] that if f is m-resilient and has degree d, then its nonlinearity is divisible by 2
and can therefore equal
We shall say that an m-resilient function achieves the best possible nonlinearity if its nonlinearity equals 2 n−1 − 2 m+1 . If 2 n−1 − 2 m+1 is greater than the best possible nonlinearity of all balanced functions (and in particular if it is greater than the best possible nonlinearity of all Boolean functions) then the Sarkar-Maitra-Tarannikov-Zheng-Zhang's bound can obviously be improved. In the case n is even, the best possible nonlinearity of all Boolean functions being equal to 2 n−1 − 2 n/2−1 and the best possible nonlinearity of all balanced functions being smaller than 2 n−1 − 2 n/2−1 , Sarkar and Maitra deduce from their divisibility result that
for every m-resilient function f with m ≤ n/2 − 2. In the case n is odd, they state that N f is smaller than or equal to the highest multiple of 2 m+1 which is less than or equal to the best possible nonlinearity of all Boolean functions, which is smaller than 2 n−1 − 2 n/2−1 (see [17] for more details). For m ≤ n/2 − 2, a potentially better upper bound can be given, whatever is the evenness of n:
is integer-valued. But Parseval's relation a∈F n .
We shall call "Sarkar et al.'s bounds" all these bounds, in the sequel. High order resilient functions with high degrees and high nonlinearities are needed for applications in stream ciphers, but designing constructions of Boolean functions meeting these cryptographic criteria is still a crucial challenge nowadays in symmetric cryptography. We observe now some imbalance in the knowledge on cryptographic functions for stream ciphers, after the results recently obtained on the properties of resilient functions [7, 8, 22, 23] . Examples of mresilient functions achieving the best possible nonlinearities have been obtained for small values of n [19, 22, 23] and for every m ≥ 0.6 n [29] (n being then not limited). But these examples give very limited numbers of functions (they are often defined recursively or obtained after a computer search) and these functions often have cryptographic weaknesses such as linear structures. Designing constructions leading to large numbers of functions would permit to choose in applications cryptographic functions satisfying specific constraints. It would also make more efficient those cryptosystems in which the cryptographic functions themselves would be part of the secret keys.
The paper is organized as follows. At section 2, we study the known constructions of resilient functions and the nonlinearities of the functions they produce. We study the nonlinearities of Maiorana-McFarland's functions more efficiently than the previous papers on this subject could do, thanks to a new upper bound that we introduce. We characterize then those functions which reach Sarkar et al.'s bound and we exhibit functions achieving high nonlinearities. At section 3, we introduce a super-class of Maiorana-McFarland's class. We study the degrees, the nonlinearities and the resiliency orders of its elements and we give examples of functions in this class having good cryptographic parameters.
The Known Constructions of Reasonably Large Sets of Cryptographic Functions, and Their Properties
Only one reasonably large class of Boolean functions is known, whose elements can be cryptographically analyzed.
Maiorana-McFarland's Construction
In [1] is introduced a modification of Maiorana-McFarland's construction of bent functions (cf. [12] ) whose elements, viewed as binary vectors of length 2 n , are the concatenations of affine functions 1 : let k and r be integers such that n ≥ r > k ≥ 0; denote n − r by s; let g be any Boolean function on F 
where φ i (y) is the ith coordinate of φ(y), is m-resilient with m ≥ k. Indeed, for every a ∈ F r 2 and every b ∈ F s 2 , we have
since every (affine) function x → f φ,g (x, y) + a · x + b · y either is constant or is balanced and contributes then for 0 in the sum x∈F r 2 ,y∈F s
The degree of f φ,g is s + 1 = n − r + 1 if and only if φ has degree s (i.e. if at least one of its coordinate functions has degree s), which is possible only if [24] is rather precise, but the upper bound N f φ,g ≤ 2 n−1 − 2 r−1 obtained in [9, 10] does not involve the size of φ −1 (a). This upper bound is efficient when φ is injective. Notice that in this case, f φ,g is then exactly k-resilient, where k + 1 is the minimum weight of φ(y), y ∈ F s 2 and that g plays no role in the nonlinearity of f φ,g or in its resiliency order. Thanks to these bounds, the nonlinearity of f φ,g can also be precisely determined when g is null (as noted in [9, 10] ) and more generally when g is affine, and also when max a∈F r
according to relation (3) ,
Notice that, φ being chosen, the case g affine is unfortunately not the most interesting one from nonlinearity viewpoint. Indeed, in relation (3), for a given a, the sum
In the next proposition, we improve upon the upper bound proved in [9, 10] and we deduce further information on the nonlinearities of MaioranaMcFarland's functions, which shows for instance why Sarkar and Maitra could not find 4-resilient Maiorana McFarland's functions in 10 variables with nonlinearity 480.
Proposition 1. Let f φ,g be defined by (2). Then the nonlinearity
Assume that every element in φ(F s 2 ) has Hamming weight strictly greater than k
Under this hypothesis, if f φ,g achieves the best possible nonlinearity 2
If r = k + 1 then φ takes constant value (1, · · · , 1) and n ≤ k + 3. Either s = 1 and g(y) is then any function in one variable or s = 2 and g is then any function of the form y 1 y 2 + l(y) where l is affine (thus, f is quadratic, i.e. has degree at most 2). (1) 
Hence, according to relation (1) :
If every element in φ(F s 2 ) has Hamming weight strictly greater than k, we have Since max a∈F r
. Its nonlinearity being equal to 2 Examples of Optimum Functions. We give now examples of resilient Maiorana-McFarland's functions with high nonlinearities. The existence of some of these functions have been already shown in the literature. But this was often done by random search while a deterministic construction is provided here. We shall reduce our investigation to m-resilient functions with n even or with n odd and m > n/2 − 2, since in the case n is odd and m ≤ n/2 − 2, we do not know what is the precise bound. 2 . This nonlinearity is the best known nonlinearity for k-resilient functions; moreover, for k = 1, 2 (n = 5, 9) it achieves Sarkar et al.'s bound (this does not imply, in the case n = 9, that f φ,g achieves Siegenthaler's bound because 2 n−1 − 2 2k > 2 n−1 − 2 k+1 ; in fact, the maximum possible degree of f φ,g is 2k + 1). For n = 9, this optimal function can be obtained by Sarkar and Maitra's algorithm A given in [22] . We have here its precise description. Notice that it is impossible to obtain nonlinearity 2
with a quadratic n−1 4 -resilient function (or even more generally with a partially-bent function): recall that such function has this nonlinearity if and only if its kernel has dimension 1 (see [5] ) and that it can then be n−1 4 -resilient only if there exists an affine hyperplane with minimum weight strictly greater than n−1 4 . This is clearly impossible for n ≥ 9.
• For any s > 0, choose r ≥ 2 s − 1 and set k = r − 2. Improved Resiliency Orders. The functions satisfying the hypothesis of Proposition 1 are not the only ones in Maiorana-McFarland's class which can achieve Sarkar et al.'s bound. We describe below two other cases. The first one has also been considered by Cusick in [11] , but in a more complex way and without looking for the best possible nonlinearity. • f ≤ 2 + log 2 (k + 3). If r = k + 2 then n ≤ k + 6 + log 2 (k + 3) and d
Proposition 2. Let f φ,g be defined by (2).

Assume that every element in φ(F
Assume in addition that: a. for every a ∈ F
The proof has to be omitted because of length constraints.
Other Examples of Optimum Functions. Choose again three positive integers r, k and s such that Another way of modifying f φ,g into a function with the same number of variables and the same parameters as the function f φ ,g above would be to take f (x, x r+1 , y) = f φ,g (x, y) + x r+1 . But this kind of function having a linear term, it is less suited for cryptographic use (for instance, it has a linear structure, i.e. the derivative f (x, x r+1 , y) + f (x, x r+1 + 1, y) is a constant).
Remark:
In the case that every non-empty set φ −1 (a) is an affine set, then more can be said: assume that φ −1 (a) is either the empty set or a flat for every a, that it is empty for every word a of weight ≤ k, and that, for some positive integer l, the restriction of g to every non-empty set φ
A drawback of Maiorana-McFarland's functions is that their restrictions obtained by fixing y in their input are affine. Affine functions being cryptographically weak functions, there is a risk that this property be used in attacks. Also, Maiorana-McFarland's functions have high divisibilities of their Fourier spectra, and there is also a risk that this property be used in attacks as it is used in [4] to attack block ciphers. A purpose of this paper is to produce a construction having not this drawback and leading to a larger class of cryptographic functions. Before that, we study the other known constructions.
Dillon's Construction
In [6] is used an idea of Dillon (cf. [12] ) to obtain a construction of resilient functions. Similar observations as for Maiorana-McFarland's construction can be made on the ability of these functions to have nonlinearities near Sarkar et al.'s bound. But this class has few elements.
Dobbertin's Construction
In [13] , Hans Dobbertin studies an interesting method for modifying bent functions into balanced functions with high nonlinearities. Unfortunately: 
Maiorana-McFarland's Super-class
The functions of the super-class of Maiorana-McFarland's class that we introduce now are concatenations of quadratic functions (i.e. functions of degrees at most 2).
Quadratic Functions
It is shown in [14] that any quadratic function f (x) is linearly equivalent to a function of the form
where 2t is smaller than or equal to the number of variables and where l is affine. The functions we shall concatenate below are not general quadratic functions, because the parameters of the functions could then not be evaluated, but they have a slightly more general form than (5). They are defined on F 2t 2 and have the form
where
and c is an element of F 2 . We shall need in the sequel to compute sums
f (x) . We know (and it is a simple matter to check) that if there exists i = 1, · · · , t such that u i is null and v 2i−1 or v 2i is not null, then f is balanced and thus
We consider now the case where
It is a simple matter to check that x2i−1,x2i∈F2 (−1) uix2i−1x2i equals 4 if u i = 0 and equals 2 if u i = 1. Thus
v2i−1v2i+c . Applying this to the function
j=1 a j x j , we deduce: 
The Maiorana-McFarland
The restrictions of f ψ,φ,g obtained by fixing y in its input are quadratic functions of the form (6) 
where E a is the superset of φ −1 (a) equal if r is even to
and if r is odd to
Remark: let y be an element of F 
Cryptographic Properties of the Constructed Functions
Algebraic Degree
Let f ψ,φ,g be defined as in Definition 1. The degree of f ψ,φ,g clearly equals 
where |E a | denotes the size of the set E a defined in Theorem 1.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 and is omitted because of length constraints. We have seen above that the nonlinearity of a Maiorana-McFarland's function f φ,g can be more easily determined when φ is injective. The function is then "three-valued". The nonlinearity of f ψ,φ,g can similarly be more precisely determined when all the sets E a have size at most 1, i.e. when the quadratic functions whose concatenation is f ψ,φ,g have disjoint spectra. Proof. For every two elements y = y of F s 2 , since ψ(y) and ψ(y ) have weights smaller than or equal to M , at most 2M indices i ≤ t satisfy ψ i (y) = 1 or ψ i (y ) = 1. The condition satisfied by φ implies that there exists i ≤ t such that ψ i (y) = ψ i (y ) = 0 and φ 2i−1 (y) = φ 2i−1 (y ) or φ 2i (y) = φ 2i (y ), and the hypothesis of Proposition 5 is satisfied. Thus every set E a contains at most one element. Theorem 2 completes the proof. Assume that (a, b) has weight smaller than or equal to k. Then a has weight smaller than or equal to k. Let y be an element of the set E a (defined in Theorem 1), then for every index j in I y , we must have a j = 1. According to the hypothesis on I y , the word a must then have weight strictly greater than k, a contradiction. We deduce that the set E a is empty and, thus, that χ f (a, b) = 0.
Balancedness and Resiliency
In , at most one element of F be injective and such that φ −1 (a) = ∅ for every a of Hamming weight at most k (f φ,g is then k-resilient for every g; we have seen that such functions can achieve high nonlinearities). Choose a subset I of {1, · · · , t}, where t = r 2 and denote its size by M . In our choice of the values taken by ψ, some of the vectors in ψ(F t 2 ) will have I as support and the others will be null. To ensure that f ψ,φ,g is k-resilient, we need that for every y ∈ F s 2 such that ψ(y) = 0, the word obtained from φ(y) by erasing all its coordinates of indices j ≤ 2t such that j 2 ∈ I has weight strictly greater than k. So we choose a subset U of F r−2M 2 of minimum weight at least k + 1, we denote byŨ the set of all y ∈ F s 2 such that the wordφ(y) obtained from φ(y) by erasing all these coordinates belongs to U , and we set ψ such that ψ i (y) = 1 if y ∈Ũ and i ∈ I and ψ i (y) = 0 otherwise. Assume that every non-empty set E a is a flat and that, for every a such that φ −1 (a) ∈Ũ , the restriction of g to E a is bent. Then the upper bound of Theorem 2 is achieved. We have E a = ∅ for every a of Hamming weight at most k, |E a | = 1 for every a such that w H (a) > k and φ −1 (a) ∈Ũ and |E a | = 2 2M for every a such that. w H (a) > k and φ −1 (a) ∈Ũ . Then f ψ,φ,g has same resiliency order and nonlinearity as f φ,g .
